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Introduction  
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (henceforth, HT), a radical fringe group, encourages young people to 
turn away from British culture and ideology, indoctrinating them with Islamism. For over 
three decades, HT has operated freely within British society, yet its inner workings are still 
unknown. Since HT’s arrival in the UK, its activism has focused on recruiting young people. 
The demographic composition of UK membership is disproportionately skewed towards 
youth, for instance, ‘85 per cent of members are below the age of 30 and 96.3 per cent were 
recruited before the age of 25’ (Wali 2013, p. 116). The age composition of HT membership 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Dr. Farhaan Wali, Email: f.wali@bangor.ac.uk, School of Philosophy and 
Religion, Bangor University, Bangor, Gwyneed, Wales, UK LL57 2DG 
Abstract 
Trying to generate ethnographic data to study Islamist groups in a natural setting 
has always presented a problem for researchers seeking to comprehend 
the radicalization process. Islamist groups operate in a clandestine manner, 
making it difficult to penetrate their inner workings. The researcher was given 
access to the inner workings of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a clandestine radical Islamist 
organization. Having accessed the group, the paper seeks to present an account of 
the methods used by Hizb ut-Tahrir to indoctrinate new members to its ideology 
and activist orientation. The personal narratives obtained from this ethnographic 
fieldwork are placed into a frame of reference related to how indoctrination occurs 
within Hizb ut-Tahrir. My access to Hizb ut-Tahrir put me in the unique position 
of being able to gather the biographical information required to study 
indoctrination. As the findings show, Hizb ut-Tahrir indoctrination is a narrow 
cognitive process that has distinct behavioral outcomes. 
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is not unexpected, as countless popular movements attract young activists (Engel 2001, p. 39). 
However, the focus is not to determine why some young British Muslims join HT, but rather 
to understand the method of indoctrination within HT. It is extremely difficult to pinpoint 
exactly how some young Muslims become indoctrinated within HT because this side is kept 
secret. As a result, trying to gain proximity to HT radicals is an incredibly complicated task. 
After lengthy negotiations with senior HT officials, I was granted limited access to observe 
the Halaqah (indoctrination) process of HT. By observing the Halaqah, I witnessed the 
transformative method of HT indoctrination, as young novices gradually adopted the ideology 
of HT. 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Liberation Party) 
 
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of HT, witnessed the West colonize the Muslim 
world, solidifying non-Muslim supremacy. He was disgusted with the hegemony of western 
culture, which he blamed for weakening the Muslim world (Al-Nabhani 2002a, p. 4). Western 
culture played a key role in evoking HT’s ideological awakening. According to al-Nabhani 
(2002b, p. 13), the only way to neutralize the dominance of western culture was to enact HT 
ideology.  
At the practical level, HT ideology is derived from the Islamic core sources. The 
groups aim is rather simplistic, as they want “to impose Islam on the world” (Nadeem, HT 
Member). Therefore, the official goal of HT is to “resume the Islamic way of life” and to 
convey it to the whole of humanity (al-Nabhani 2002b, p. 24). Very little is known about how 
this clandestine group functions, in terms of its structure and recruitment, but since its 
conception in the Middle East it has progressively sought to expand, making the lack of 
scholarly focus surprising. As a result, HT’s activities have gone relatively unnoticed, 
allowing them to establish a popular base of support among some young Muslims in Britain.  
In the early 1980s, HT surfaced as a revolutionary Muslim youth movement in the United 
Kingdom. They besieged university campuses in order to provoke an Islamist revival among 
the apathetic student populace. Consequently, they rapidly acquired notoriety for their 
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combative public activity. The media branded them a “fanatical group of Moslem extremists”, 
intensifying their attractiveness among the Muslim youth (Daily Mirror, 04.03.94). Despite 
increasing its national profile, HT received widespread condemnation for its intolerant stance 
to other religious groups. Universities quickly became a central battleground for HT, despite 
the National Union of Students (NUS) authorizing a total ban preventing HT from assembling 
any kind of campus activism. Attempts at curbing HT did not stop estranged Muslim youth 
turning to HT ideology. HT ideology is championed as the divinely inspired method to solve 
the complexities of western society, offering a sense of belonging and purpose to disaffected 
young Muslims. In this paper, the primary objective is to understand the procedures utilized 
by HT to indoctrinate new recruits, shedding light on these techniques will help me tackle the 
appeal of Islamist ideology. 
 
Methodology: An Ethnographic Approach 
 
Trying to document HT indoctrination techniques was very challenging because the 
process occurs behind closed doors. For this reason, the research collected in this paper 
occurred over two separate periods. In 2004, as part of my research into the history of HT, I 
conducted extensive interviews with the pioneers of the UK branch, namely Farid Kassim and 
Omar Bakri Mohammed.2 These historical narratives provided invaluable insight into how HT 
formed and established its first study circles, giving a full account of the methods used to 
indoctrinate young people during 1986-1996. However, the interviews with these founding 
members of the UK branch were conducted in 2004. I did not want to simply accept the 
historical accounts of Omar Bakri and Farid Kassim as fact, because their observations may 
be outdated. In other words, is the current Halaqah system in HT the same as the one 
established under the leadership of Omar Bakri? I believe the interviews conducted with 
Omar Bakri and Farid reveal a great deal about how the first Halaqahs formed in the late 
                                                 
2 When the interview with Omar Bakri took place, he was not a member of HT. He left HT in 1996 and formed 
Al-Muhajiroun (ALM), a splinter organisation that was banned in the UK in 2005. So, his reflections are as the 
former leader of the UK branch, which is still important as he formulated and implemented key HT strategy 
related to indoctrinating novices.   
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1980s. According to several senior members, the Halaqah structure has not changed, the 
techniques and strategy employed by Farid and Omar Bakri remain active.3 This means for 
over three decades the Halaqah system has been indoctrinating young novices in relatively 
the same way.  
In 2009, I began the second phase of research, employing an ethnographic approach to 
capture the member’s opinions on the indoctrination process. This entailed conducting 
lengthy fieldwork amongst HT members. After spending several months interacting with new 
recruits and members, I was granted access to the private Halaqah. The fieldwork observed 
four separate Halaqah’s over a 12 month period, and within this time, 36 activists were 
interviewed and observed, providing insight into the inner workings of HT indoctrination. The 
Halaqahs took place weekly, and approximately lasted two hours. The primary function of the 
Halaqah is to indoctrinate novices, making attendance compulsory. A Mushrif 
(leader/instructor) is appointed to explain HT ideology and oversee the indoctrination process. 
All the Halaqahs I observed comprised of a Mushrif and five to six novices. The Mushrif 
would go through the book Nidham al-Islam (System of Islam), one paragraph at a time, 
explaining its meaning and significance. The novice was expected to progress in their 
conceptual knowledge and understanding of HT ideology and it was the Mushrif’s 
responsibility to provide weekly reports on individual progress to the Masool (area leader).   
I was not permitted to record or make written notes while observing the two-hour 
Halaqah. Initially, I was told that I could not interact with the novices attending the Halaqah. 
However, as I gained partial acceptance, I was allowed to engage with novices. Often I would 
accompany activists after the Halaqah to get food, giving me an opportunity to talk to the 
novices in greater detail. Furthermore, I was not given permission by HT to document the 
location where the Halaqahs took place, nor the details of those who attended. Despite these 
limitations, I was still able to observe and monitor the techniques HT employed to 
indoctrinate new activists. This gave me a sense of the inner workings of the Halaqah 
                                                 
3 In 1996, Omar Bakri formed ALM; he initially duplicated the HT indoctrination model. However, in 2003, he 
adopted the ideology of Wahhabism. He changed the Halaqah to an educational format, employing a fixed 
syllabus with large number of students.   
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process.  
Conducting research amongst clandestine organizations, like HT, raises important 
ethical concerns related to informed consent and conflict of interest. Although I undertook the 
necessary ethical precautions prior to beginning my research, as I engaged in the fieldwork I 
quickly discovered that the boundaries between researcher and research subject started to 
become distorted. This posed significant ethical challenges. I revised my ethical approach, 
after consulting the literature related to “insider research” (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). I 
first sought to acquire informed consent from the leadership; rather than just approaching 
local novices, because command structure in HT is centralized and non-democratic. This 
meant I could not engage with grassroots activists until I had acquired formal consent from 
the leadership committee. Utilizing my network of contacts, I was initially granted limited 
access to the organizational activity of HT. This allowed me to develop familiarity with the 
activists and eventually I was not seen as an outsider. In due course, HT leadership granted 
me entry to the Halaqah, upon the request of the local activists. In some way, I believe the 
local members believed I could be indoctrinated by HT ideology, as they saw it as divine 
truth. However, I did not hide my intentions and purpose, and thus all participants were aware 
of my research. The second aspect related to conflict of interest. Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a 
banned organization under UK law, and thus they have the right to organize in a public or 
private manner. Therefore, I did not witness any act contravening British law, which meant I 
could report my findings without conflict with the UK legal framework.          
During the fieldwork, the problem of “selective perception” became an issue of 
concern (Ray 2009, p. 297). In other words, as Ray (2009, p. 297) explains, if one studies a 
distinct process at length, then representativeness of the sample may be compromised. In 
order to offset this possible problem, four separate Halaqahs were observed, giving 
observational access to multiple novices in different social settings.    
Although there has been a significant study of Islamist movements, little research has 
used an empirical approach to study this phenomenon. After reading major works, and 
through personal contact with some main theorists and researchers engaged in the debates, a 
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number of problems concerning methodology were identified. Firstly, there was a 
considerable lack of access to reliable data sources. This is because Islamists operate secretly 
and use morally unacceptable behavior to achieve their goals, making it difficult to document 
their activities in real settings (Hoffman 2006, p. ix). Secondly, throughout these research 
studies, the relationship between data and theory was not properly constructed, providing only 
a partial picture of the influence that radical Islamist groups have on individual identity.  
Adopting an ethnographic approach gave an opportunity to study the activities of 
group members in their natural surroundings. This method provided a means to interpret the 
social world of the Islamist, giving insight into the indoctrination method within HT. For this 
reason, adopting an ethnographic approach provided an opportunity to study the activities of 
group members in their natural surroundings (Gobo and Molle 2016, p. 49). Burgess (2002, p. 
65) believes, “the value of being a participant observer lies in the opportunity that is available 
to collect rich and detailed data based on observations in natural settings”. Conversely, a 
critical appraisal of previous approaches to Islamic radicalization showed that most theorists 
reject “participant observation” of radical groups because it is judged infeasible (Stump and 
Dixit 2013, p. 83). There are two reasons for this view: ethnomethodology is often difficult to 
understand, and it is even harder to apply. However, this study was able to observe Islamists 
through participant observation, which most social scientists have been unable to achieve 
when trying to understand processes of radicalization in a group setting. In summary, the 
justification for this study is primarily based on methodological grounds, enabling me to 
answer some key questions related to how radical Islamist groups indoctrinate young people. 
 
Indoctrination  
 
At the beginning of this study, it was assumed once entry into HT had been achieved, 
then it would be relatively easy to locate instances of indoctrination. Instead, it was extremely 
difficult to isolate specific techniques constituting indoctrination. So, it became apparent 
clarity concerning indoctrination had to be obtained. Wilson (cited in Snook 2010, p. 17-18) 
makes an interesting distinction between indoctrination and conditioning based on 
  
 
 
 
 
Farhaan Wali: Islamist Indoctrination 
 
 
 
 
36 
dichotomizing belief and behavior. This would imply indoctrination fits together with beliefs, 
while conditioning relates to behavioral process. In simple terms, “we condition people to do 
something; we indoctrinate them to believe something” (Snook 2010, p. 2). Another way of 
framing this process would be radicalization. Indoctrination and conditioning represent two 
distinct components of the same larger process, namely radicalization.  
In this respect, radicalization is a transformative process. According to Horgan and 
Braddock (2010, p. 152), radicalization is a “social and psychological process” whereby an 
individual adopts an “extremist political or religious ideology”. Some social theorists see 
radicalization as consequential for violence, or at least a natural precursor of violence 
(McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017; Horgan and Braddock, 2010). Trying to equate HT with 
violence is extremely problematic, because it does not actively incite violence. In a leaked 
home office report, for instance, HT were described as a “radical, but to date non-violent 
Islamist group” (The Guardian, 22/07/2005). For this reason, Snow and Byrd (2007) argue 
that a gap can occur between radical opinion and radical action. The outcome, however, is not 
necessarily towards more violence. In fact, flexibility of ideology may either support or help 
undermine violence, and there is no clear-cut cause and effect to be seen (Snow and Byrd 
2007).  
After surveying the available literature, it is relatively clear that most scholars agree 
radicalization involves three fundamental ingredients: (1) individual change (Kennedy and 
McGarrell 2012, p. 83; Koomen and Pligt 2015, p. 234); (2) interaction with social 
environments and external situations (Bartlett and Miller, 2012; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; 
Wiktorowicz, 2005); (3) contact with radical actors and groups (Sageman, 2016; Hafez and 
Mullins, 2015).4 As Sageman (2016) points out, within these transformative phases 
individuals develop negative associations (e.g. discrimination or social deprivation), which 
distort their reading of the social world, making them susceptible to indoctrination.  
This is why, when the novice enters the Halaqah, they are first subjected to 
indoctrination. The division between indoctrination and conditioning is quite apt for the 
                                                 
4 Online radicalization (e.g. that may take place within cyber space) still involves these elements, but without the 
physical interaction (Mandaville, 2005). 
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processes that take place in the Halaqah, as novices freely join HT and actively agree to 
undergo indoctrination. Therefore, as will be revealed, indoctrination within HT is a group 
activity lead by the indoctrinator, which takes place in the Halaqah. It is the indoctrinator’s 
primary function to inculcate his novices with the correct ideological belief system. As 
explained in Nidham al-Islam (Al-Nabhani 2003c, p. 1), “man revives according to what he 
carries of thought…in order for man to revive, it is necessary to radically and 
comprehensively change his current thought and generate another thought for him”. 
Therefore, indoctrination occurs within the Halaqah, while behavioral modification and 
conditioning occur outside of the Halaqah. Abdul (HT member) described the Halaqah as a 
“deep and profound culturing experience”, giving him a totally new cognitive perspective 
with which to view the social world. This would indicate that, first of all, the Halaqah was the 
location of indoctrination. This is because from social constructivist theory5 ‘framing’ of 
indoctrination and radicalization draws upon a collective phenomenon that is essentially 
contextualized to two key agents: the group and the individual (Pisoiu 2011, p. 143). 
Consequently, radicalization occurs after lengthy and sustained indoctrination, as it relates to 
individual transformation (Kennedy and McGarrell 2012, p. 83). This would suggest that 
indoctrination is the first step in the radicalization process.  
There are many different ways of framing the subject of indoctrination. This paper 
will utilize social psychology, because as the term implies it incorporates both social and 
mental processes (Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2015, p. 28). Indoctrination, in a social 
psychology context, entails renouncing traditional ideals, which then facilitates thought 
realignment (Popplestone and McPherson, 1999). This definition offers a good starting point, 
but it requires adjustment because it is far too broad in its scope and application. For example, 
the same definition of indoctrination could be given to those who undergo a religious 
conversion. According to Rambo and Farhadian (2014, p. 2), there are two transformations 
that are central to the conversion process: complete change in all aspects of life, and a new 
                                                 
5 Social constructivist theory is grounded within the sociological school of thought, it relates to the mechanisms 
individual’s experience when participating in group settings (Greene and Kropf 2009, p. 123). 
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consciousness of the well-being of others. In general, the act of religious conversion might 
have a similar result to indoctrination, but these two forms of change are not identical.  
A central aspect of change in HT is the deep process of indoctrination, which fashions 
a fresh cognitive viewpoint with which to view the social world. At this time, I want to 
quickly look at cognitive theory, in order to understand its meaning in the context of 
indoctrination. Social cognitive theory defines behavior as a mutual interface between an 
inner emotional state and triggers that exist in the environment (Gawronski and Payne, 2011). 
Social psychologists seek to identify the key cognitive and motivational changes that occur 
within individuals when they become group members. The Islamist group is the principal 
location for the construction of a new cognitive outlook because members are ready to bend 
towards group expectation (Le Bon, Gustave, 2012). This indicates a strong relationship exists 
between individuals and groups, enabling HT to change the cognitive perspective of 
members. According to Wiktorowicz (2005, p. 19), direct contact with the extremist group 
can trigger a “cognitive opening”. This opening is a gateway to the comprehensive alteration 
of previously held beliefs. Thus, the fascination with the radical group often leads to a 
“cognitive opening”, activating a process of ‘religious seeking’ (Wiktorowicz 2005, p. 19). 
The triggers for this opening are multifaceted and greatly hinge on the experiences of the 
individual, making them vulnerable to the movement. 
Consequently, individuals are characterized and placed in an in-group. Members then 
internalize this membership as an aspect of their identity (Amer and Awad 2015, p. 92). In 
this respect, the basis for a member’s self-definition changes within the group, allowing his or 
her personal identity to be submerged into a collective identity (Le Bon 2012, p. 18). 
According to Triplett (1898), moving from a state of social exclusion to a group setting can 
drastically diminish one’s sense of individuality. Similarly, Cicchetti and Cohen (2006, p. 
431) found that increased interaction with other members prompts individuals to change their 
attitudes in accordance with the group consensuses. In other words, for the cognitive 
transformation to take effect the individual must align his viewpoint with HT ideology.  
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In a group environment, members come to understand their social world by way of 
shared representations. According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2015), cognitive change 
provides a framework for understanding the external world, by rendering a situation 
meaningful. At this stage of the HT indoctrination process, an individual aligns their cognitive 
viewpoint with that of the group. This reconfiguration acts as a unifying force, shaping the 
individual’s thoughts and behavior into synchronization with HT ideology. This makes the 
cognitive process an active force in the construction of one’s reality (Valle and Eckartsberg, 
2012). At the heart of this cognitive process is the making sense of the ‘other’. The perception 
of the ‘other’ is reconfigured and various forms of ‘us and them’ are constructed. In theory, 
the individual then internalizes these representations in their actions and responses. Forging a 
new cognitive essence within HT requires a change in the way a novice thinks and acts until 
he or she becomes a walking manifestation of HT ideology.   
 
Pre-HT Indoctrination 
 
Omar Bakri, the first UK Amir (leader), claimed HT targeted young people that had 
experienced racism in their childhood, utilizing the psychological pain they felt, as a means to 
radicalize them in adulthood.6 By exploiting a key developmental stage HT were able to 
redirect a recruit’s negative feelings to a radical treatment. In Britain, as HT started its 
activism in the early 1980s, the leadership quickly realized that second generation British 
Muslims were struggling to develop stable identities. According to Omar Bakri, this 
perpetuated two completely opposing identities, which he dubbed, the “Bobby and Abdullah 
syndrome” (Omar Bakri interview, 26.03.2004). At home, the “Abdullah persona” would 
revert to an ethnic association, speaking the language of his parents and adhering to their 
custom. However, outside the home, the “Bobby persona” would materialize. As Omar Bakri 
(interview, 26.03.2004) declared, “he would drink, go clubbing and be fully integrated 
                                                 
6 The interviews conducted with Omar Bakri sought to document how HT established itself in the UK (e.g. mode 
of activism, organisation, targeting young Muslims etc.). Therefore, the interviews were based on Bakri’s 
reflections from 1986-1996 (the year he arrived in the UK and the year he left HT).   
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[British culture]”. The HT radicalization process required finding young people that had 
become socially estranged, during their socialization, because these individuals exhibited 
greater enthusiasm towards HT ideology. Uncertainty during socialization adversely affected 
identity development, enabling HT to target young British South Asians (Wali, 2013).   
HT deliberately singled out British South Asians as a distinct demographic, because 
they supposedly suffered through their socialization. They developed dysfunctional identity 
structures that lead to a proclivity for greater belonging. Data indicates that 98 per cent of HT 
activists in the UK are South Asian, making HT ethnically homogenous (Wali 2013, p. 128). 
HT’s South Asian recruits developed through the life cycle struggling to adjust their identity, 
lacking the ability to control their surroundings, which perpetuated a deep feeling of 
frustration. As Bakri explained, the individuals he recruited all experienced some form of 
social difficulty that marred their socialization. Thus, under Bakri’s leadership HT sought to 
establish radical cells, comprising almost exclusively of young Muslims. To facilitate this 
process, the founding members methodically targeted ethnic minorities, arousing a sense of 
conflict with the dominant culture. This would be achieved by exploiting the dual aspect of 
socialization received by minority groups. Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) explained how the 
experiences of young Muslims being racially attacked, in the cases he observed, caused them 
to be “distrustful of Kuffar (non-Muslims)”.  
This process of ‘othering’ non-Muslims can be traced back to the development of HT 
ideology. According to Taji-Farouki (1996, p. 114), the inception of the movement “lies in the 
response ... to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the fragmentation of its territories into 
nation-states, the creation of Israel and the impotence of Muslim societies in the face of neo-
imperialism”. In this respect, HT ideology was articulated post-World War Two in response 
to the perceived cultural and political dominance of the West and thus was contrived within a 
specific framework of confrontation. Firstly, al-Nabhani framed the conflict with the West 
into a religious dichotomy and as an inevitable clash between ‘Iman’ (belief) and ‘kufr’ (dis-
belief). This, as Kurtz and Turpin (1999, p. 641) explains, gives the confrontation a “larger-
than-life” dimension. Secondly, as the interaction with the West matured, al-Nabhani sought 
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to fabricate a distorted narrative of confrontation with the West, depicting it as monolithic and 
dangerous. This manufactured polarization between Islam and the West allowed al-Nabhani 
to demonize Western culture and society.  
Consequently, these and other adverse social experiences enabled HT, during the 
1980s, to cultivate a group of young Muslims who had been marginalized through 
socialization. According to Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004), the young Muslims he encountered 
were ‘lost’, because they had “no personality of their own”. These young men were stripped 
of their identity, as Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) states: “your identity is corrupted, you feel 
pain because the western culture created racism, you have (the) western personality, (this) 
must be taken away”. When I asked Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) that this appears to be 
indoctrination, he said “it is brainwashing…these young people have been corrupted by the 
west and this corruption must be washed out, so it’s brainwashing, but with Haq (truth)”. 
Consequently, HT in its infancy in the 1980s was dependent on a select group of young 
people, directing their efforts on those who appeared to be unsuccessful in obtaining a 
traditional place in society.  
The second condition that created motivation for HT ideology among the recruits 
during 1986-1996 was their apparent estrangement from society. According to Bakri 
(interview, 26.03.2004), these Muslims had become alienated by society, because they felt 
rejected and lacked opportunity for participating in society. In this case, the young recruits 
developed social grievances against the majority population becoming largely apathetic. Why 
did young HT recruits feel alienated from their society? The disaffection of an individual 
often tends to be a combination of frustrations that have been triggered by various social 
environments. In order to exploit the perceived alienation of some young Muslims, HT would 
concentrate on specific themes, such as racism. HT would specifically target alienated young 
Muslims at universities, as Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) explains: “this is where I met 
Bobby…when he start[s] to rave and dance with them, they call him paki, now that’s a crisis. 
He sacrificed everything, and then you call me paki”. Consequently, one can conclude social 
alienation was used to manipulate the recruit, creating susceptibility to HT ideology. This 
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insidious technique sought to exploit young Muslims, by projecting them as victims of the 
“unbelievers”. 
 
In-group Indoctrination: The Halaqah system 
 
HT Indoctrination invites questions about how it influences novice behavior and 
attitudes. During interviews with HT novices in 2009, it became difficult to discuss the issue 
of HT indoctrination, as many novices refused to acknowledge the term. They felt it had a 
negative connotation and it implied they had been forced to join HT. On the surface, HT 
indoctrination does not include any form of physical confinement, coercive persuasion or 
bodily threat. Some theorists have described indoctrination as “milieu control” (Lifton 2012, 
p. 420). This entails the enforcement of “unethical practices” to control intellectual thoughts 
within the group setting, manufacturing a deep sense of separation from society (Snook 2010, 
p. 12). This definition needs more clarification. Unethical practices may refer to the 
inculcation of concepts and beliefs into an individual in a closed environment, like the 
Halaqah. There is a noticeable problem with this definition: it is too general. According to 
this definition, teaching children in a classroom environment could be classified as a form of 
indoctrination. Using the term in this way ignores the content of teaching, which determines 
whether teaching is indoctrination. As Flew (1972, p. 285) stated, “no doctrine, no 
indoctrination”. It is important to divide indoctrination into two distinct stages: primary (the 
Halaqah) and secondary (pursuance). 
Members believe HT is unique. A key reason for this belief relates to the rigid 
protocols that govern group activity. These protocols permit HT to assign tasks at every level, 
but in actuality, it confines novices from rationalizing activity. Omar Bakri (interview, 
26.03.2004) claimed he “built all the cells” in the early 1980s and placed the new recruits into 
the Halaqah, which is a private study group comprising one member and five to six novices. 
HT indoctrination occurs in the Halaqah, cultivating new thoughts and creating dependency 
on HT. The Halaqah became the static point of HT indoctrination, as it placed the novice 
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within a closed setting that removed them from an external anchor, allowing inculcation of 
HT ideology. Before entering the Halaqah, the novice has an established set of ideas related 
to society and life, forming the ideological point of reference for their existence. However, 
when placed in the Halaqah with other novices, the ideological point of reference fragments 
as the HT indoctrinator engineers a new ideological viewpoint. As Wilson (2010, p. 14) 
asserts embedding beliefs through authoritative figures can replace reason, making it a form 
of illegitimate indoctrination.  
At the start of the fieldwork in 2009, the presence of the researcher monitoring the 
Halaqah was a concern, as it seemed to distort the normal function of the Halaqah. However, 
as time passed acceptance was gained, allowing the Halaqah to be observed in its natural 
environment. By observing the Halaqah in its everyday setting, the cognitive and behavioral 
changes experienced by novices over a 12-month period could be observed and documented. 
Initially, the changes observed were attributed to indoctrination and conditioning. However, 
this according to Winn would suggest that the novices were ‘unaware’ of the Halaqah 
purpose (Winn 2012, p. 4). Yet, as observed, novices join the Halaqah process willingly. As 
AQ (novice, 04.07.2009) declared, “the H [Halaqah] removes ideological contamination and 
builds the correct ideological foundation”. This suggests novices acknowledge the 
transformative agenda of the Halaqah.  
As Lifton (2012, p. 4) noticed, indoctrination is not an all-encompassing 
transformative method that can achieve “total control over the human mind”. As Farid 
(interview, 26.06.2004) explained, the Halaqah does not “create mindless automatons…we 
want ideologues”. The Halaqah is the location where novices are ideologically reformatted, 
having their thoughts and behavior realigned to HT ideology. Authoritative indoctrination 
may seek a similar outcome, but it employs a range of persuasive techniques as Lifton’s 
(2012) study of Chinse communists revealed. In this regard, radicalization as a descriptive 
measure fits the aims and method of the Halaqah, as HT radicalization centers on the novice’s 
ideological framework. 
From 1986, Omar Bakri assembled the first UK Halaqahs, indoctrinating the first 
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generation of HT recruits. In the Halaqah, Omar Bakri went about changing the novice, 
indoctrinating them with HT’s Islamist ideology. This would involve attaching the thoughts 
and ideas to specific modes of behavior, as to generate a change, which apparently ‘developed 
a deep and profound way of thinking based on the Islamic ideology’ (Omar Bakri interview, 
26.03.2004). The Halaqah process became the central mechanism to sustain the purity of HT 
ideology by dispersing the ideology throughout the party cells. According to Omar Bakri, the 
Halaqah enabled him to mobilize HT into active cells, which through constant replication 
gave birth to newer cells across the country.  
Omar Bakri assigned great importance to the Halaqah process, bestowing serious 
attention to its precise undertaking. The Halaqah had one primary function to indoctrinate the 
novice in a concentrated manner. The Halaqah was used to indoctrinate the novice with a 
shared belief system, forming a single unit of members, embodying HT ideology.  According 
to Farid (26.06.2004), the Halaqah focused on developing the ‘aqlya’ (mentality) and the 
‘nafsyya’ (disposition) of the novice. The process of constructing the ‘nafsyya’ (disposition) 
among the novices was essential because HT activity was dependent on the commitment of its 
members. Omar Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) believed the ‘nafsyya’ would determine the 
“level of sacrifice and commitment” members allocated to the party cause. Omar Bakri was 
the main Mushrif (instructor) of the early recruits in the 1980s, regulating the Halaqah and 
assuming full responsibility for its supervision. The Halaqah was configured in a way that 
made it differ entirely from the academic and philosophical styles of teaching. According to 
Omar Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004), the academic style had been rejected as a means of 
disseminating HT ideology because it detracted the novice from HT’s ideological aim and it 
did not “build Islamic personalities”. Importantly, the numbers admitted into the Halaqah, by 
Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004), was deliberately restricted and organized broadly around the 
same level. Bakri claimed the academic style “lacks productivity”. For instance, he felt 
culturing novices in large classes prevented the Mushrif from tailoring HT ideology to the 
varying strengths and levels of each novice. 
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Halaqah Procedure 
 
Starting the Halaqahs was given special consideration because it was the Halaqah that 
created ideological change. Omar Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) declared “if the Halaqah was 
organized incorrectly” then HT indoctrination would not occur. Thus, he formulated a 
comprehensive set of preventive procedures that would safeguard the Halaqah process. 
Firstly, the preliminary stage of acceptance would be used to maintain the integrity of the 
Halaqah, Bakri explained. In this respect, four standard guidelines would be used to first 
establish in the novice a general awareness of HT ideology, which a prospective novice had to 
obtain as a prerequisite for entry into the Halaqah. At this stage of entry, HT makes a crucial 
distinction between acquiring a general awareness and that of conviction; the latter is only 
procured after a deep process of indoctrination through many years of study within the 
Halaqah. In contrast, a general awareness entails a basic acceptance that these auxiliary 
thoughts are correct and require action. For this purpose, Bakri developed four entry-level 
guidelines that had to be fulfilled to gain admittance to the Halaqah, which is designed to 
extend beyond energetic zeal. Firstly, to consolidate, a novice must accept Islam as a 
complete way of life that addresses all temporal and spiritual problems. Secondly, the need to 
abide by the ‘Hukm Shari’ (divine Islamic law) in all remits of life must be demonstrated, 
especially related to the establishment of the ‘Khilafah’ (Islamic State). Thirdly, the novice 
must agree that the work to establish the ‘Khilafah’ is a political action. Finally, admittance 
cannot take place until the novice acknowledges HT as the only Islamic party correctly 
working to establish Islam. The novice prior to admittance into the Halaqah must agree on 
these four areas.  
The preliminary discussions with the novice would usually take place through 
individual contact or in small public circles, commonly referred to as an intermediate 
Halaqah. The intermediate Halaqah, Farid (26.06.2004) explained, would consist of “three or 
four circles addressing each of the guidelines”. Omar Bakri made it clear to the new recruits 
they had consented to “work” for HT. This was important, as Farid explained because HT 
  
 
 
 
 
Farhaan Wali: Islamist Indoctrination 
 
 
 
 
46 
strongly discourages the use of the term “study”. Rather, “emphasis was given to work”, as 
HT does not invite people for scholarly study, instead they seek ideological activists who will 
energetically work to establish the objectives of HT (Farid, 26.06.2004). According to HT, 
Islam is a religious and political ideology, within which sovereignty belongs exclusively to 
God. This means human agents do not have the mandate to govern, making “man-made” 
ideological systems invalided. This is why HT rejects participation within the political 
system, and thus require the recruitment of activists willing to operate outside of the system. 
The new recruits on their admission to HT were explained two further issues by Omar 
Bakri. Firstly, the work to establish Khilafah required clear ideas about Islam. According to 
HT, Islam is a divine doctrine from which a complete system of human governance emanates. 
This ideological interpretation seeks the holistic enforcement of the Islamic legislative system 
in society (e.g. enactment of Sharia Law), as Islam is the only source of worldly guidance. HT 
ideology view’s Islam as a complete system of human governance, deciphering all human 
problems (e.g. political, economic, social and ethical). This makes it mandatory for human 
beings to implement the ideology of Islam. In order to acquire this ideological understanding 
of Islam necessitated committing to studying these ideas within the Halaqah system. 
Secondly, the novice must attend the Halaqah regularly, being punctual and committing 
themselves to two hours a week, non-compliance is ‘haram’ (sinful act).  
Therefore, the Halaqah has been ordained with special administrative consideration, 
as it implants the ideology within the novice. This means its regulation must be conducted in a 
strict and consistent manner. For this reason, the Mushrif assumes direct responsibility for the 
supervision of the Halaqah. The Mushrif, for example, must submit a detailed Halaqah report 
to the Masool (area supervisor) after every Halaqah informing him of the progression of each 
novice. Within this report, the Mushrif documents tardiness. If a novice is late on a regular 
basis, then the Masool will take action. As Omar Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) explained, 
“lateness cannot be tolerated” as this reduces the importance of HT’s work.  
This is why the Halaqah has distinct stylistic rules. The Halaqah should be given in a 
manner that influences the novice to initiate thinking and feeling. The Halaqah facilitates the 
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novice to construct his or her own views rationally and freely. This suggests indoctrination is 
an “intentional activity” (Wilson 2010, p. 18). However, this ignores the Mushrif, who is the 
indoctrinator. The Mushrif guides the novice to arrive at the correctness of HT ideology, but 
this should not occur through blind obedience. The Mushrif assumes full responsibility for 
explaining the content of HT ideology, which is proceeded by a discussion of the concepts 
raised to gain clarity. Importantly, HT enforced strict guidelines on the Mushrif, for instance, 
he alone could answer questions, without exception, as the credibility of the Mushrif would be 
brought into question if a particular novice answered questions on his behalf. HT 
administrative law had gone to meticulous depths to explain every minute detail related to the 
Halaqah. According to Farid (26.06.2004), detailed guidelines had even been documented 
about the mannerisms of the Mushrif, especially when delivering a Halaqah. “The Mushrif 
should be quiet and soft spoken, and control his nerves during questions, discussion and 
explanation and be cautious not to get angry or agitated”. HT has given the ‘Halaqah’ the 
highest seriousness, as it indoctrinates novices. 
 
Starting a Halaqah 
 
During the establishment of the first UK cells, Omar Bakri gave each newly started 
Halaqah special consideration. In this respect, Omar Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) requested 
all Mushrifs to act like a “father figure to the novice”, guiding and fostering the burden of the 
novice’s development. The Halaqah built the Hizbi personality. This ideological remolding 
starts with changing the cognitive perspective, which entails removing the remnants of the old 
ideological viewpoint. The novice grew up in a secular environment, exposed to an array of 
non-Islamic standards. The western ideological viewpoint became the basis for action. For 
this reason, the first phase of Halaqah was assigned to studying the book ‘Nidham al-Islam’ 
(system of Islam). The first chapter deals with belief, while the second confronts the topic of 
fate and destiny. These two chapters were used to indoctrinate the novice with a new 
ideological outlook. As one member explained: “Halaqah is a building process…corrupt 
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concepts are destroyed and the correct concepts built” (Wali 2013, p. 106). This suggests the 
goal of the Halaqah is an indoctrinated individual. The HT activists interviewed all objected 
to the use of the term indoctrination, as they collectively felt it implied a lack of rationality. 
According to Wilson (2010, p. 19), indoctrination can be generated through rational and non-
rational methods. In the Halaqah, the Mushrif rigidly regulates the discussion, making the 
Halaqah a contrived social space.  
Al-Nabhani, in his book Mefahim (Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir), states study in 
Halaqah should be a cultural process and not an academic one. Thus, teaching in Halaqah 
should not be detached from the individual; rather, the culturing process needs to build 
“warmth, enthusiasm, deep thinking and broad knowledge” (Al-Nabhani 2001, p. 27). In its 
broadest sense, warmth refers to building a link between the ‘Iman’ (faith) and the obedience 
to the ‘Sharia’ (Islamic Law). Enthusiasm is the subsequent energy that needs to be directed 
towards carrying out positive activity. Deep thinking involves understanding a set of concepts 
intensely from its nucleus, degrading the reliance upon superficial thought. Finally, broad 
knowledge is to have a wide array of understanding on an assortment of issues that are not 
restricted to a few sources. The primary focus for the Mushrif is to build warmth and 
enthusiasm, which is then proceeded by depth and broadness. 
 
Secondary HT Indoctrination: Persuance 
 
The first Halaqahs were designed to change the sentiments and inclinations of the 
novice because, as Omar Bakri (interview, 26.03.2004) explained, “they were brought up in a 
corrupt western society”. However, Omar Bakri realized the Halaqah was a short medium, as 
it is conducted once a week for two hours. To build a conceptual framework in a clear and 
precise manner required substantial pursuance outside of the Halaqah. Pursuance entailed 
following the novice naturally outside of the Halaqah, to see whether they had assimilated the 
concepts of the Halaqah into their daily life. According to Omar Bakri (interview, 
26.03.2004), the Mushrif would visit the novice “in his home or take him to the Mosque”, 
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bringing him closer to the novice. At this early stage, converts to Islam were treated 
differently, as Mushrifs were required to give more time to them because they had to be taught 
the fundamentals of religious belief and practice. Through the Halaqah Omar Bakri sought to 
create an environment of ‘spirit’ that connected the novice to God, via HT. The new members 
were key to this pure environment; they had to lead by example. Therefore, the Mushrif was 
sanctioned with the duty to consolidate his Halaqah into a unified cell. In this respect, the 
process of indoctrination occurred within the peer group setting.  
In order to understand pursuance, I was able to observe the interplay between Mushrif 
and novice outside of the Halaqah. In essence, novices formed closed peer group bonds, 
which reinforced HT ideology. As Nina (novice) said: “…practicing was hard early on 
because you’d be told what to do and how to do it” (cited in Wali 2013, p. 107). This interface 
seems disproportionate, as the behavioral norms within the peer group are regulated by HT 
ideology. In addition, pursuance developed close relationships with amongst the novices and 
the Mushrif, making indoctrination easier. As Sara explained: “I really trusted the sisters; we 
became close and I revealed a lot to them about myself” (cited in Wali 2013, p. 107). 
Familiarity with peer groups cultivates ideological socialization (Howe, 2010). Peer 
socialization was an important developmental stage in the pursuance process, as it gives the 
novice a framework to view and interact with the social world. The novices I observed 
seemed fully engaged within the peer group, creating a strong attachment to HT. As one 
novice observed: “we’d do dawah (spread HT ideology) and then we’d chill…there is a 
collective spirit we have”. As with all group dynamics, the peer group indoctrinated a deep 
sense of group identification among the novices. “In sum, the novice sought identification 
with the peer group for the following reasons: (1) membership provided benefit; (2) it offered 
distinctiveness from other social groups; (3) there was a sense of common experience” (Wali 
2013, p. 106).  
When an individual joins HT, they are deliberately engineered towards conformity. 
This pressure is exhibited, in the first instance, by assuming the role of a novice. This initial 
stage of interaction with HT gradually brings their behavior into alignment with the norms of 
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HT. Most importantly, HT exploits the need to belong within the novice, providing him or her 
with a feeling of self-importance by conveying a new cognitive worldview. As the 
indoctrination process deepens, the novice is gradually conditioned to accept the moral 
supremacy of HT ideology. This is clear from the comments made by Farid, concerning the 
need for the individual to embody HT ideology in all aspects of his or her life, as he states:  
“The power of the ideology attracted us to the party, and 
I felt that power when I used to visit other people’s 
circles and meetings. You just felt this incredible 
confidence, not arrogance, but confidence. The truth is 
arrogant, so you feel this power and that’s never gone 
away from me, twenty years plus now” (Farid Kassim 
interview, 26.06.2004).  
This view suggests how the individual develops reliance on HT, inspiring loyalty and long-
term commitment. Shaw (1986, p. 359) makes a similar claim about membership in a terrorist 
group, as they provide ‘a solution to the pressing personal needs’ that is not realized in the 
wider society. This gives the individual a new identity and a role in society, albeit a negative 
one, which in a passive sense forces conformity. This is equally true for members of HT, as 
they cannot envisage life outside of HT. 
 
The Halaqah Experience 
 
Up until now, a descriptive account of the organizational procedures used by HT to 
indoctrinate novices has been the focus, now attention is given to the reactions of novices to 
the Halaqah process. Before the Halaqah formally began, several novices expressed a sense 
of eagerness. As Irfan (interview, 02.09.2009) explained, “I had to wait two months for the H 
[Halaqah] to start, so I was desperate to lift the Fard [Islamic duty] of my neck”. Shahid 
(interview, 05.07.2009) expressed a similar sentiment, “the Halaqah is the highest activity in 
the Hizb, and it’s where you experience the party culture”. These two reactions provide some 
interesting insight into the novice’s psychological state of mind prior to starting the Halaqah. 
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As Allen and Cowdery (2014, p. 451) discovered, the ‘learner’ displays greater eagerness to 
learn than the instructor does. This is because the novice enters the Halaqah process to initiate 
intellectual transformation, as they believe the implementation of HT ideology relies on the 
Halaqah process. Furthermore, novices believe attending Halaqah is an Islamic duty. 
Attaching the mundane activity of the Halaqah to the sacred elevates it to a higher value act. 
In other words, attending Halaqah becomes a religious duty, which if neglected incurs divine 
punishment in the afterlife.  
 After several weeks had elapsed, the novices began to demonstrate a sharp shift in 
their personal disposition, which started to give way to the collective group identity. As AQ 
(interview, 18.07.2009) suggested, “after the first month we [novices in Halaqah] were a 
unit…our criteria were Allah and his Messenger”. This indicates the reference point for action 
was Islam, as governed by HT ideology. According to HT, British Muslims only partially 
understand Islam, as they mix it with non-Islamic laws. In fact, as one member declared: 
“Muslims only know Islam by its rituals”. This suggests members view Islam as a religious 
and political ideology. As Aminur (interview, 30.08.2009) explained: “Islam is not just a list 
of do’s and don’ts, it gives solutions to daily problems”. Although the Islamic religious 
system was revealed 1400 years ago, HT activists believe the ideological side of Islam is still 
alive and intact in the ‘Quran and Sunnah’ (divine legislative sources). HT argues these two 
sources generate a comprehensive set of legal laws that governs all aspects of human affairs. 
As Irfan (interview, 02.09.2009) declared, “Islam is superior to western ideology because it 
makes the human being subservient to Allah (god) rather than to his own desires”. This 
suggests HT ideology orients member’s actions exclusively to God. This translates into 
complete submission to the speech of the “law-giver” relating to human actions because 
according to HT, God has laid down the hukm (rule) for every action and thing in this world 
(Al-Nabhani 1998, p. 36). 
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Dropping Out 
 
The study monitored 36 HT activists, 32 novices, and 4 Mushrifs, over a 12 month 
period. During this period 11 novices ‘dropped out’. After interviewing the novices who 
dropped out, it became apparent that ideological disagreement was the primary reason for 
dropping out. As Adam (interview, 05.10.2009) explained, “I only had two or three 
conversations with HT members before I joined, I think after the fourth or fifth Halaqah I 
left…I kept challenging the Mushrif about Islamic history and philosophy, which he knew 
nothing about…they just want blind followers”. An analysis of the small sample of data 
collected suggests 34 percent of novices left HT. This dropout rate is not evenly distributed, 
as 90.9 percent dropped out in the first six weeks, making orientation the most likely period of 
dropping out. This is not surprising as cognitive realignment is sought during the early 
formation of the Halaqah. If novices are unwilling to abandon their ideological viewpoint, 
then dropping out is likely. As Dawud (ex-novice, interview, 15.08.2009) noted, “HT culture 
is weak, it rationalizes ideals that are out molded…Khilafah is not compatible with modern 
society”.  
However, beyond ideological disagreement, several other factors were also cited. Two 
novices had to drop out because of family pressure. As Jamal (interview 16.05.2009) 
explained, “when my dad found out I joined the Hizb, he lost it; I just decided it was not 
worth all the grief”. In Muslim households, the family is usually patriarchal, with elder males 
dominating the social affairs of the family. Therefore, parental control played a role in some 
novices dropping out, fearing the reaction of family members to joining a clandestine Islamist 
group. However, as Ash (ex-member, interview, 06.07.2009) explained, “the Hizb [HT] 
encourages the shab [novice] to disobey [parents] as they [HT] say loyalty belongs to god, not 
the father”. If the novice allows family bonds to supersede HT ideology, then the novice may 
become susceptible to returning to old ideologies. 
When novices join HT, they must confront a social world at odds with their 
ideological viewpoint, making it difficult to remain if doubts exist. Therefore, the Halaqah is 
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designed to challenge the ideological makeup of a novice, gradually replacing the old beliefs 
with HT ideology. In other words, the Halaqah becomes the focal point for change, as it 
provides answers to the meaning of life. The novices remaining in the Halaqah process 
eventually underwent a cognitive transformation over a period of three months, changing the 
way they viewed the social world. As Irfan (interview, 02.09.2009) revealed, ‘the party 
culture is superior to anything I have ever experienced’. They adopted a ‘holistic’ viewpoint, 
which gave them guidelines and systems that applied to every aspect of their daily life. In 
other words, HT indoctrination changed the novice’s self-awareness, as their new ideology 
took center stage in their lives. HT indoctrination is an ongoing process, providing meaning 
and purpose to the novice. As Sara explains, “…when I started the H [Halaqah] things 
became clearer; I could understand the concepts and culture better” (cited in Wali 2013, p. 
109). This data suggests, despite large numbers of young Muslims joining HT, there are equal 
numbers dropping out. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study has revealed HT indoctrination to be a narrow and distinct psychosocial 
phenomenon with identifiable patterns related to controlling an individual’s behavior. 
Indoctrination is not simply an individualistic process; rather, it is embedded in a group 
context that exerts influence over the individual.  
HT indoctrinates the novice with a distinct ideological worldview, shaping how the 
novice perceives and interacts with the social world. The inculcation of HT ideology occurs in 
the closed group setting of the Halaqah. HT describes this activity as an intellectual exercise, 
but as a political movement, they seek social change and this requires ideologically trained 
activists. The Halaqah is the central instrument employed to inculcate HT ideology. As 
Passmore (2010, p. 128) declares, ‘indoctrination is a special form of drilling in’, which in the 
case of HT entails ‘drilling’ HT ideology within the novice.  
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The function of the Halaqah is to inculcate the novice with HT ideology. Initially, this 
entails engineering a new cognitive outlook. The Halaqah as a change agent is a life-long 
technique employed by HT to reinforce HT ideology for the entire lifespan of the novice. 
However, the Halaqah does not end with membership, as all activists perpetually receive 
weekly Halaqah. This prolonged radicalization method allows the novice to navigate the 
paradoxes of the outside world. As the novice re-enters society, they encounter ideas that 
challenge their newly adopted ideology. Attending the weekly Halaqah allows the novice to 
align their social experiences with HT ideology, providing the novice with a constant point of 
reference. 
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